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I. INTRODUCTION
International energy sector investments in developing coun-
tries are complex and fraught with risk. Usually, in the initial
* J.D. Universidad Cat6lica Andr~s Bello (2005); LL.M. Harvard Law School
(2006); J.D. University of Miami School of Law (2009). I am grateful for the helpful
comments of Professors Richard Williamson, Jan Paulsson and Keith Rosenn of the
University of Miami School of Law, as well as my colleagues John Pate and Ignacio
Vincentelli on earlier versions of this paper.
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bargaining stage, the interests of the investor-frequently inter-
national oil companies (IOCs) together with project financiers-on
one side, and those of the host state and their national oil compa-
nies (NOCs), on the other, are diametrically opposed. While the
IOCs seek contractual stability, financial predictability, and an
enforceable international dispute resolution mechanism, the host
state wants to ensure regulatory and legislative flexibility, maxi-
mum tax benefits, and local law and court adjudication.
To facilitate the negotiations, both parties had traditionally
been in a relationship of mutual dependency.1 While the host
country owns the natural resources, the IOCs have the technol-
ogy, capital, management and equipment. The latter, however,
come only at high costs, which normally take the form of immova-
ble infrastructure that can be financed over considerable time. In
the petroleum industry, where price fluctuation in the interna-
tional markets is likely to occur over time, what once appeared to
be an apparently profitable arrangement for the host country can
suddenly turn undesirable a few years later.2 This phenomenon is
known as the "obsolescing bargain" and is generally described as
the dilemma the investor faces when trying to guarantee that the
host state will not act opportunistically once the investment has
been made.3
In order to mitigate the risks associated with this problem,
the IOCs have attempted to implement a number of legal and
financing techniques, such as insuring against perceived risks,
defending against these risks by using political and state-to- state
leverage, and structuring around the overall risk through complex
1. Admittedly, the North-South dependency relationship may be changing given
the emergence and growing importance of NOCs in the Middle East, Asia and other
countries, such as Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, NIOC, Pemex, Sonatrach, INOC (Iraq),
PetroChina, KPC, Petrobras, Petronas, Yukos, Lukoil, and NNPC. See generally
Energy Forum of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University
and Petroleum Energy Center of Japan, "Strategies and Influence of Emerging
National Oil Companies on World Energy Markets," http://www.rice.edu/energy/
researchlnationaloil/docs/PECNOCstudyprotocolfinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2008).
It is also important to note that several NOCs have been investing heavily in
developing regions of the world, in some circumstances replacing the role the
traditional U.S. and European private companies played. See, e.g., Juan Vega,
China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S.
Interests, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 377 (2005).
2. Margarita T.B. Coale, Stabilization in International Petroleum Transactions,
30 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 217.
3. See generally RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 46-53, 59-66 (1971).
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offshore securitization techniques.' Other contractual risk reduc-
tion mechanisms have traditionally involved the negotiation of
international arbitration clauses and addition of choice of law pro-
visions, as well as the inclusion of so-called "stabilization clauses,"
whereby the host state promises not to alter existing terms or
enact legislation or executive regulations tending to undermine
the substance of the agreement., The use of stabilization clauses
had at one point been reported to have declined. More recently,
however, stabilization clauses and complex contract drafting
appear to be making a comeback, as evidenced by the fact that oil
agreements are being entered into even by high-risk transition
economies .6
Historically, the balance in bargaining power in the petro-
leum industry between the host state and the IOCs has depended
largely on the price of oil.' During the spikes in the price of oil,
such as during the 1970s, host states saw their positions strength-
ened with respect to foreign investors, which led to widespread
nationalizations. Then, in the 1990s, when the price of oil
declined, many countries modified their positions and granted
increased benefits to the IOCs, mostly in the form of fiscal incen-
tives.' However, with the price shock of early 2008-when prices
peaked at $147 in July-a number of Latin American countries
adopted hard-line positions with respect to the Western oil compa-
nies that were heavily invested in the region, reminiscent of the
nationalizations in the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s. This
was especially true of the governmental tactics employed by the
colorful leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. As oil prices
dropped in late 2008, down to about $32 a barrel during the month
of December, host states in need of technological and financial
assistance to stabilize their oil dependent economies may have to
once again reverse their approach towards the IOCs. As a conse-
4. Thomas Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J.
215, 243; see also Coale, supra note 2, at 219.
5. See F.V. Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility in Case of "Stabilization"
Clauses, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 23 (1993).
6. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 4, at 216.
7. Thomas Walde, Renegotiating Acquired Rights in the Oil and Gas Industries, 1
J. OF WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus., 65 (2008).
8. This phenomenon has also been described as a privatization-nationalization
cycle that has seemingly prevailed in a number of resource rich countries in Latin
America. See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link
Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223
(1995).
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quence, IOCs should be in a position to be able to negotiate for
stabilization clauses and other risk reduction mechanisms more
effectively than they may have during the past several years.
The case of Venezuela, currently the ninth largest oil pro-
ducer in the world and the fourth largest supplier of crude oil to
the U.S.,9 serves as a prime example to highlight the cycles
between pro-foreign investor policies and nationalistic, anti-West-
ern practices. In Venezuela, the cycle has extended for the past
four decades, from the first term of President Prez in the 1970s
when, due to high world energy prices caused by the oil embargo
of 1973, Venezuela effectively nationalized its oil industry for the
first time, to P6rez's second term in the 1990s, when low energy
prices led to the policy called "Apertura Petrolera" (or Oil Open-
ing), under which foreign oil companies were granted highly
favorable terms, to nationalizations and increased regulatory
restrictions in the middle of the present decade under President
Chavez's reign. In particular, the most interesting case has been
that of the four Strategic Association Agreements entered into
between some of the IOCs and Venezuela for heavy-crude extrac-
tion in Venezuela's Orinoco Belt in 1993 and 1997. These agree-
ments involved some of the most important private IOCs and
required some $17 billion of foreign investment. Given Vene-
zuela's prior history, IOCs had adopted various stabilization tech-
niques in their international agreements with the hope of
forestalling, or at least dealing with, governmental interference.
Notwithstanding, these agreements were unilaterally terminated
by Venezuela in 2006, resulting in the negotiation of new agree-
ments in most cases and in two pending arbitral disputes before
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) against Venezuela by two of the IOCs.
The purpose of this study is to examine the validity of stabili-
zation clauses under international law as it applies to the petro-
leum industry and then to evaluate the usefulness of such clauses
in protecting IOCs that have made important investments with
high sunk costs in countries with elevated degrees of political risk.
Further, this article will consider the different types of stabiliza-
tion clauses used in the past and their modern resurrection. The
9. As of January 15, 2009 Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S. were approximately
1,071 million barrels per day. See Energy Information Administration, Official
Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, November 2008 Import Highlights:
January 15, 2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gaspetroleum/data-publications/
companylevel-imports/currentimport.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
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four heavy-crude projects to develop Venezuela's Orinoco Belt and
the stabilization clauses contained therein serve to illustrate the
theoretical concepts analyzed in the present study. Finally, cer-
tain conclusions will be reached as to the current and future
implementation of stabilization clauses, as well as the interplay of
this contractual risk reduction mechanism vis a vis the bargaining
power of both IOCs and host states.
II. VALIDITY OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The first basic question that must be answered is whether
stabilization clauses are valid under international law and
whether these clauses will be recognized by arbitral tribunals?
Like many legal issues, the answer depends on who you ask.
Several commentators have declared that stabilization
clauses with an intended purpose of freezing applicable law are
invalid under international law. ° The argument is roughly as fol-
lows: sovereignty over natural resources is ajus cogens norm from
which no derogation is permitted.1 Derogation would include any
agreement to contract out of rules of general international law
(e.g. an international petroleum extraction agreement under
which the host state agrees to not expropriate the assets of the
investor during the next sixty years). 2 Hence, a stabilization
clause would be invalid and a state, making use of principles of
public international law, could make continuous use of its sover-
eign powers to terminate agreements without compensation."
This view especially arose during the debates concerning sov-
ereign rights over natural resources in the discussions held at the
General Assembly of the United Nations under the guise of the
10. A number of commentators maintain that states are incapable of binding
themselves under international contracts with private parties. See, e.g.,
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, International Contract Law?, 15 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 187, 189 (1981). This study does not address these positions, rather only those that
refer directly to the validity of stabilization clauses specifically. The invalidity of
stabilization clauses had also found support in several early arbitrations. See, e.g.,
International Fisheries Co. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 691
(1931) and North American Dredging Co. of Texas v. United Mexican States (U.S. v.
Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 26 (1926).
11. LAu BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 489 (6th ed. 2003).
Evidence of the status of sovereignty over natural resources as a jus cogens norm
stems from UNGA Res. 1803 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, December 1974, UNGA Res. 3281.
12. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 527.
13. Sornarajah, supra note 10, at 217.
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"New International Economic Order" ("NIEO"). 4 In 1974, develop-
ing countries gave voice to their opinion with a degree of antago-
nism against what was considered to be a "form of economic
colonialism" 15 in the General Assembly of the United Nations
("UNGA"). Thus, UNGA Resolution 3171 gave states the right to
expropriate as "an expression of their sovereignty in order to safe-
guard natural resources... and determine the amount of possible
compensation and the mode of payment." 6 Furthermore, UNGA
Resolution 3201 declared that "no State [will] be subjected to eco-
nomic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free
and full exercise of [its] inalienable right."" The nationalistic sen-
timent of developing states was only exacerbated by the oil arbi-
tration awards decided in the 1970s,'5 which in a number of cases
resulted in outcomes with a significant gain to the investor.19 The
consequence of the fundamental differences between the develop-
ing and developed countries over the discussion leading up to the
NIEO resulted in a stalemate. As a result, and arguably with tre-
mendous opportunity costs for both sides, useful investments were
not made. The World Bank and its promotion of the ICSID Con-
vention, for instance, was one step in favor of bridging the ideolog-
ical divide between developing and developed nations. °
14. See F.V. Garcia-Amador, Current Attempts to Revise International Law - A
Comparative Analysis, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 286, 288 (1983).
15. Remarks by Kenneth Vandevelde, in Toward an Effective International
Investment Regime, 91 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 485, 487 (1997).
16. UNGA Res. 3171, Dec. 17, 1973, was approved by an overwhelming majority:
108 countries voted in favor, one against, with 16 abstentions.
17. UNGA Res. 3201 § 4(e) Dec. 4 1974, UN Doc. A/282/43.
18. This was especially perceived in the three landmark cases involving Libya: BP
Exploration v. Libya (BP Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 1974, 53 ILR 297
(1979); Texas Overseas Petroleum v. Libya (Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 1977, 17 ILM 1 (1978); and Libyan American Oil v. Libya (Libyan
American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 1977, 20 ILM 1 (1981).
19. Detlev Vagts, Foreign Investment Risk Reconsidered: The View from the
1980's, 2 ICSID RaV., 6 (1987). There is little doubt that expropriations and
nationalizations are both deemed valid acts under international law so long as these
state actions are accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation. See
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 523 (2d ed. 2005). The present article,
however, does not directly address issues related to expropriations or
nationalizations, but rather focuses on situations arising in the investor-state
relationship in the context of stabilization clauses and when host states take actions
that are short of outright expropriation or nationalization.
20. Kenneth Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements,
12 U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 166 (2005). The World Bank, under its
mandate as a development finance institution and its efforts to encourage foreign
investment by attempting to promote effective dispute settlement between host states
and foreign investors, began as early as 1961. The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (hereinafter
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On the other hand, the validity of stabilization clauses under
international law finds support in a number of arbitral awards.21
The most widely cited decision is the case of Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. The Government of
the Libyan Arab Republic (hereinafter "TOPCO").22 In this case,
Clause 16 of the Deeds of Concession contained a stabilization
clause that indicated that "the contractual rights expressly cre-
ated by this concession shall not be altered except by mutual con-
sent of the parties."23 Another provision of the agreement provided
additional protection by stabilizing the applicable legislation and
regulations as of the date of the execution of the agreement.24 The
arbitrator, Professor Ren6-Jean Dupuy, found that the stabiliza-
tion clause had not impaired the legislative sovereignty of Libya.
In fact, Libya had used its sovereign power "to commit itself inter-
nationally, especially by accepting the inclusion of stabilization
clauses entered into with a foreign private party."25 Similarly, in
Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co.,26 the tribunal con-
cluded that stabilization clauses were binding, especially consider-
ing that the state possesses legal powers to grant rights by which
"ICSID Convention"), that entered into force on Oct. 14, 1966, established ICSID as
an autonomous international organization whose purpose is to provide facilities for
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. Disputes are settled in the
manner prescribed by the ICSID Convention, which attempts to balance the interests
of the investors and the host states. In this respect it is argued that ICSID, and the
discussions leading to the ICSID Convention, played an important role in attempting
to conciliate the two conflicting interests of the developed and developing states. See
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The
Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 Am. U.J.
INT'L. L. & POL'Y 97 (1986).
21. A more complete treatment would begin with a discussion of the applicability
of the principle of pacta sunt servanda to international agreements, good examples of
which are the arguments of the Swiss Government in Losinger and Co. (Switz. V.
Yugo), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 78, and the French Government in Certain
Norwegian Loans (Fr. V. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 15 (July 6). Notwithstanding, this
discussion is omitted from this article.
22. Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R 389 (Int'l
Arb. Trib. 1978) ("TOPCO").
23. Id. at 476.
24. Royal Decree of December 1961, which became an integral part of the contract
on the basis of the Agreement of 1963, states the following: "This Concession shall
throughout the period of its validity be construed in accordance with the Petroleum
Law and Regulations in force on the date of execution of the agreement of amendment
by which this paragraph (2) was incorporated into the concession agreement. Any
amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not affect the contractual rights of
the Company without its consent." Id.
25. Id. at 477.
26. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117, 168 (Int'l Arb.
Trib. 1963).
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it forbids itself to withdraw before the end of the concession."
In the case of Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic (hereinafter "LIAMCO"), 8 the Deeds of Concession, having
been drafted on the basis of a model agreement, contained the
same Clause 16 as in the TOPCO Case. The arbitrator in
LIAMCO found that the stabilization clauses incorporated in this
contract were binding under international law, and that they were
justified both by Libya's own domestic legislation, as well as by
the general principle of the sanctity of contracts recognized in
both municipal and international law.2 9 Interestingly, the arbitra-
tor also found that the stabilization clauses were consistent with
the principle of the non-retroactivity of law, which is, according to
the arbitrator, a legal maxim consistent with Islamic law, based
on the Koranic verse: "We never punish until we have sent a mes-
senger (XVII,15). "13°
In Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment
Corp.,31 the validity of a tax stability clause that imposed a ceiling
for taxes on profits and royalties with respect to the extraction of
aluminum was in question. The arbitrators found that the clause
was valid on the basis that a government "may for certain periods
of time impose limits on the sovereign powers of the State, just as
it does when it embarks on international financing by issuing long
term government bonds on foreign markets."32 The arbitrators
found that the commitments were binding under international
law having been entered into in an unqualified legal manner.
Hence, the clause would remain valid notwithstanding that the
legislative branch had the authority to change the terms of the
agreement according to the national constitution of Jamaica.
The arbitration between AGIP Spa v. Government of the Pop-
ular Republic of the Congo34 involved an oil distribution agree-
ment that contained two stabilization clauses requiring that the
government not apply to the company certain ordinances or
decrees which would tend to change "the private joint-stock com-
27. Id.
28. Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 1977, 20 I.L.M. 1 (Int'l Arb.
Trib. 1981) ("LIAMCO").
29. Id. at 56.
30. Id. at 31.
31. Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 17 I.L.M. 1321,
1322 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1978).
32. Id. at 1342.
33. Id.
34. AGIP Spa v. Govt of the Popular Republic of the Congo, 67 I.L.R. 318 (Int'l
Arb. Trib. 1977).
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pany character," and requiring that the government not "modify
unilaterally the Company's Articles of Association."35 In April
1975 the Government of the Congo issued Order No. 6/75 nation-
alizing the company and transferring its assets to Hydro-Congo,
the state oil corporation. The arbitrators found that the unilateral
dissolution of the company was a repudiation of the stabilization
clauses which had resulted from the common will of the parties
expressed at the level of the international juridical order and
which did not infringe on the sovereignty of the Popular Republic
of the Congo." The stabilization clauses had the effect of prevent-
ing the government from invoking certain powers against a party
with which it had contracted not to do so. 37
In the events leading to the ICSID arbitration American Inde-
pendent Oil Company v. Kuwait38 the parties had entered into a
Concession Agreement containing a stabilization clause under
which the government promised not to alter the terms of the
agreement through legislation.3 9 The arbitrators called into ques-
tion the jus cogens argument that countries have permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources, and added that it is "useful that
host States should. . . be able to pledge themselves not to nation-
alize a given foreign undertaking within a limited period, and no
rule of public international law prevents them from doing so."40
Although the tribunal recognized the legitimacy of stabilization
clauses, it found that in this particular case the expropriation was
not covered by the stabilization clause because it did not make
specific reference to nationalization. It should be noted that the
tribunal's insistence on an express reference to nationalization in
the stabilization clause has been the subject of considerable criti-
cism. 41 For future consideration, the tribunal suggested that in
order for a state to be effectively bound by a stabilization clause,
the agreement should expressly stipulate the undertaking in
35. Id. at 338.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 343.
38. American Independent Oil Co. v. Kuwait, 66 I.L.R. 519 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1984).
39. Id. at 520. Article 17 of the agreement read as follows: "The Shaikh shall not
by general or special legislation or by administrative measure or by any other act
whatever annul this Agreement except as provided in Article 11. No alteration shall
be made in the terms of this Agreement by either the Shakih or the Company except
in the event of the Shaikh and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the
interest of both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or additions to this
Agreement."
40. Id. at 588.
41. See, e.g., TAIDA BEGIC, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DIsPuTEs 89 (2005).
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detail, and should only cover a "relatively limited period of time."42
Finally, in the first of two decisions handed down by the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran,43 the tribunal found that contractual provisions
in relation to the long term supply and purchase of petroleum
products precluded a sovereign during the stated period from
exercising the rights it otherwise possessed under international
law to take an alien's property without just compensation."4 4 Also
consistent with this decision was the case of Phillips Petroleum
Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran.45 Phillips had entered into a
Joint Structure Agreement with the National Iranian Oil Com-
pany (NIOC) to participate in the exploitation of petroleum
resources, which was later unilaterally terminated by NIOC and
then declared null and void ab initio by the Iranian legislature.
The tribunal found that compensation for the annulment was
owed independently of whether the expropriation had been formal
or de facto, and regardless of the fact that the rights involved were
intangible contract rights.46
A number of commentators have criticized the historical cases
mentioned supra, several of whom coincide in arguing that stabili-
zation clauses are invalid under international law. In particular,
the criticisms tend to center on the notion that the practice of
international commercial arbitration is biased so as to consist-
ently favor the economic interests of the developed countries.47
Others argue that arbitral awards decided against the host states
have been forced upon them, since the states consented to arbi-
trate out of a sense of subrogation.48 Lastly, another group of
42. American Independent Oil Co., 66 I.L.R. at 589.
43. Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 184 (1991).
44. Id. at 186.
45. Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 82 A. J. INT'L L. 136
(1988).
46. Id. at 139.
47. See Amr Shalakany, Arbitration and The Third World: A Plea for Reassessing
the Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419, 422 (2000).
However, Jan Paulsson for instance has indicated that while it may be true that in
the beginning of the 20th century, and until the 1950s, arbitrations conducted by
various international tribunals or commissions evidenced bias against developing
countries, this is no longer the case: "the dice are loaded no more." See Jan Paulsson,
Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration, 2 ICSID REV. 19, 21
(1987).
48. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79, 97 (1986); Andrew Guzman, Why
LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them, Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 659 (1998).
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authors point to the transformative process of international arbi-
tration whereby the alleged ascendancy of U.S.-based interna-
tional law firms and their frequent representation of claimants
and respondents, the predominance of proceedings in English, and
the increasing popularity of foreign lawyers receiving their LL.M.
degrees in the U.S.49 is all leading to the "Americanization"5 of the
international arbitration process, and perhaps of standards of fair
compensation under international law in general.
Nevertheless, the status of the law today would appear to be
that a state, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, may bind and
temporarily limit its authority by contract. Hence, stabilization
clauses, restraining the host state from unilaterally amending the
terms and conditions of an agreement through legislation, regula-
tion or other means, should be found to be valid by future arbitral
tribunals .51
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE AND
THE VALIDITY OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
International law is not per se the law that will be applied by
an arbitrator in the context of an investor-state agreement or dis-
pute, unless the parties have specifically indicated that it is the
applicable law. 2 Hence, it has been suggested that a stabilization
clause inserted in an ordinary state contract governed by munici-
pal law will lack international validity because the validity of such
a clause rests on the international character of the agreements."
This problem, however, will be moot provided that the parties'
choice of law clause clearly indicates that international law is
applicable to the agreement. Accordingly, if the agreement con-
tains an express choice of law clause that has the effect of remov-
ing the contract from the domestic forum of the contracting state,
subjecting it to a hierarchically superior legal order, stabilization
49. See Carole Silver, The Case Of The Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing The
U.S. Legal Profession, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1039, 1084 (2002). See generally John
Flood & Fabian Sosa, Lawyers, Law Firms and the Stabilization of Transnational
Business, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 489 (2008) (documenting the phenomenon of
LL.M. students employed in New York law firms).
50. Kevin Jacobs & Matthew Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed
Nationalization, Rising Commodities and "Americanization" in International
Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 359, 370 (2008); see also Shalakany, supra note 47, at 422.
51. Garcia-Amador, supra note 5, at 49.
52. Emily Witten, Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?, 4
Tex. J. Oil, Gas & Energy L. 55, 64 (2009).
53. Garcia-Amador, supra note 5, at 48-49.
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clauses will be considered valid under international law.5 4
It should be noted that some commentators sustain the posi-
tion that choice of law clauses may not be valid under interna-
tional law. Under NIEO, for instance, agreements and disputes
would always be governed by the domestic laws of the host nation,
and even more so where the contract involved the exploitation of
mineral resources in the host state.5 However, it would seem that
the overriding majority of scholars and arbitral precedent support
the view that choice of law clauses selecting the application of a
law different from the domestic law of one of the parties has the
effect of "internationalizing" or "delocalizing" the contractual rela-
tionship, and thus found to be perfectly valid.56
IV. ARE STABILIZATION CLAUSES USEFUL?
Historically, outright expropriation or conduct of a host state
depriving a foreign entity of benefits derived from property inter-
ests without just compensation 7 within the host state was seen as
the greatest threat to foreign investors. In general, however, today
it would seem that the days of the Calvo Clause, the Drago Doc-
trine, the Hull Rule, and the massive wave of expropriations of
foreign ownership have ended, at least for the time being. In con-
trast, the greater threat in the last decade has more often come in
one of two forms.
The first, a "forced sale," occurs when the host state enters
into a negotiation with an investor to purchase its interests, but
then undermines the investor's bargaining position such that
there can be no true sale and rather the investor ends up
accepting a lower price than would have resulted from a freely
54. Coale, supra note 2, at 227.
55. Sornarajah, supra note 10, at 189.
56. Garcia-Amador, supra note 5, at 48-49.
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 712,
cmt. b (1987).
58. The Calvo Clause, named after 19th Century Argentine Diplomat Carlos
Calvo, required investor-state disputes to be settled by local courts under domestic
law. See Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the
Rebirth of the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169 (1995). The Drago Doctrine forbade the use of force for the
collection of public debt in Latin America. See T.S. Woosley, Drago and the Drago
Doctrine, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 558 (1921). The Hull Rule, named after Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, entailed a rule of customary international law that would require
that prompt, adequate and effective compensation be paid to the expropriated foreign
investor. See Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien
Property, 75 AM. J. IW'L L. 553 (1981).
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negotiated sale under equitable conditions.59 In the context of Ven-
ezuela, for instance, the agreement between the national govern-
ment and Verizon Communications to purchase its 28.5%
controlling share in the country's principal telephone company,
CANTV, in 2007 for $572.25 million was seen by many as a below-
market price. 0 Unfortunately, stabilization clauses may offer lit-
tle protection with respect to forced sales.
The second type of threat that investors face is that of "creep-
ing expropriation," which normally occurs when states exercise
their right to regulate or when the state uses its police powers. It
is described as the "slow and incremental encroachment on one or
more of the ownership rights of a foreign investor that diminishes
the value of its investment."6 ' This form of state action may create
the greatest problems for investors as often such practices are dif-
ficult to prove, compensation will often not be forthcoming, and
the host state will suffer less harm to its reputation as may occur
in a situation of outright expropriation. Hence, the investor will
often have less bargaining power in these cases. Nevertheless, for
this type of threat it is suggested that stabilization clauses do
have an important role to play, but provided that they are suffi-
ciently explicit as to the kinds of detrimental state practices.
A. The Right to Regulate
Despite the foregoing considerations, even if a state enters
into an agreement with a stabilization clause, the state will still
be able to regulate certain matters. The ability to regulate has
been especially recognized when it is based on protection of the
environment or the public welfare.6 2 But if this right to regulate
exists, what is the value of a stabilization clause? Will the addi-
tion of a stabilization clause to the agreement make any differ-
ence? Is it just a drafting technique to make the contract "doubly
59. Detlev Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 17, 19 (1978).
60. Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Venezuela Plan Shakes Investors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01Ii0/
business/worldbusiness/lOvenezuela.html?scp=6&sq=venezuela%20cantv%20value&
st=cse (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
61. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Taking of Property,
Series on issues in international investment agreements (2000), http://www.unctad.
org/en/docs/psiteiitdl5.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
62. Jan Paulsson, Indirect Expropriation: Is the Right to Regulate at Risk?, http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/52/36055332.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
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safe"?6 3
The evolution of a state's right to regulate has been recog-
nized in several important arbitral awards. In Sedco, Inc. v.
National Iranian Oil Co.' the tribunal noted that a state will not
be liable for economic injury that is a consequence of a bona fide
regulation within the accepted police power of states. 5 More
recently, in a case decided by a tribunal under existing treaty obli-
gations of NAFTA, Methanex Corp. v. United States of America,'
the U.S. was not found liable for regulations implemented by the
State of California banning the use of a fuel additive (MTBE and
ethanol) that the state had- considered dangerous to public
health." Also, in EnCana v. Republic of Ecuador,61 despite
acknowledging certain limitations on the state, the tribunal held
that "in the absence of a specific commitment from the host state,
the foreign investor has neither the right nor any legitimate
expectation that the tax regime will not change. .. during the
period of the investment."69
A state's right to regulate is limited, however. The state must
act in good faith and it is to treat the foreign investor in a fair and
equitable manner. Both notions have primarily been developed in
arbitral awards resolving investor-state disputes. In S.D. Myers,7 °
the tribunal found Canada liable for expropriation for its regula-
tory restrictions even though motivated by genuine environmental
concerns, as the regulations in question were rather deemed to be
part of a strategy to protect national business interests. In con-
trast, in the Methanex case the tribunal noted that the ban was
"motivated by the honest belief, held in good faith and on reasona-
ble scientific grounds, and that the [disputed additive] contami-
63. Credit for this question is given to Thomas Waelde and George Ndi. See
Garcia-Amador, supra note 5, at 33.
64. Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248, 275
(1985).
65. Id. at 275.
66. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, 2005 WL 1950817 (UNCITRAL
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf (last
visited Nov. 12, 2008).
67. See id.
68. EnCana Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, 2005 WL 3804543 (LCIA 2006),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EncanaAwardEnglish.pdf (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009.
69. See id., at 173.
70. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, 2000 WL 34510032 (UNCITRAL 2000), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SDMeyers-lstPartialAward.pdf (last visited Feb.
17, 2009).
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nated groundwater was difficult and expensive to clean up."71
Importantly, taxation measures, which are a common element
in petroleum industry disputes, have also been deemed to fall
within a state's police powers." However, in certain circum-
stances, changes in the tax structure of certain contractual
arrangements or agreements may be deemed expropriatory. Three
recent awards, all dealing with the denial of tax rebates, held that
tax measures may have an expropriatory effect on the foreign
investor."
Most published awards have developed the meaning of "fair
and equitable treatment" as it exists under treaty obligations, but
often it is considered to be the existing standard under customary
international law and, hence, equally applicable in the context of
investor-state agreements.74 In Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets,
L.P. v. Argentina" the tribunal considered the meaning of fair and
equitable treatment under the U.S.-Argentina bilateral invest-
ment treaty ("BIT") and found that one of the principal goals of
the treaty was to seek a stable framework for investment. There-
fore, stability was "a key element" of fair and equitable treatment
under the treaty. Similar importance was given to regulatory sta-
bility by the tribunal in OEPC v. Ecuador76 in holding that "stabil-
ity of the legal and business framework is thus an essential
element of fair and equitable treatment."77 In PSEG Global v. Tur-
key"' the "roller-coaster effect" of Turkey's continuing legislative
changes was found to be a breach of the fair and equitable treat-
ment obligation, as investor's basic expectations of stability can-
not be met "in a situation where the law kept changing
71. Methanex Corp. 2005 WL1950817.
72. Jay Wagner, Expropriation of Oil and Gas Investments: Historical, Legal and
Economic Perspectives in a New Age of Resource Nationalism, 77, http://www.
aipn.org/members/modelagreements/research.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
73. See, e.g., Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, 2002 WL 32818521 (ICSID 2002);
Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, 2004 WL
3267260 (LCIA 2004).
74. A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Pursuit of Stability in International Energy
Investment Contracts: A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends, 39-40, http:ll
www.aipn.org/members/modelagreements/details.asp?id=146 (last visited Oct. 28,
2008).
75. Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina, 2007 WL 5366471 (ICSID
2007).
76. Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, 2004
WL 3267260 (LCIA 2004).
77. Id. at 183.
78. PSEG Global v. Turkey, 2007 WL 1215067 (ICSID 2007).
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continuously and endlessly."79
In Seimens v. Argentina,0 fair and equitable treatment was
said to be treatment in an even-handed and just manner, condu-
cive to fostering the promotion and protection of foreign invest-
ment. 1 The tribunal excluded bad faith or malicious intent of the
host state as a necessary element in proving the failure to treat an
investment fairly and equitably, as that would be inconsistent
with the purpose and expectations created by the BIT. 2 However,
it remains uncertain whether similar pro-investor treatment
would be given to contract language similar to the rather vague
and general terms found in the treaties.
In MCI Power Group v. Ecuador,3 the tribunal rejected the
investor's fair and equitable treatment claim and emphasized that
the "legitimacy of the expectations for proper treatment enter-
tained by a foreign investor protected by [a treaty] does not
depend solely on the intent of the parties, but on certainty about
the contents of the enforceable obligations." 4 One can only assume
that had the investor had the desire and leverage to memorialize
its expectations in a well-drafted stabilization clause, the tribunal
may have reached a different result.
B. Contractual Provisions
In a recent ICSID award in the case of Parkerings-Com-
pagneit v. Lithuania,85 involving an agreement without a stabili-
zation clause for the design and planning of a parking facility in
Lithuania, the tribunal stated that "save for the existence of an
agreement in the form of a stabilization clause or otherwise, there
is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the reg-
ulatory framework existing at the time the investor made its
investment."86 The tribunal went on to note that "the Claimant
could (and with hindsight should) have sought to protect its legiti-
mate expectations by introducing into the investment agreement
79. Id.
80. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, 2007 WL 1215068 (ICSID 2007).
81. Id. at 290.
82. Id. at 291.
83. M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Ecuador, 2007 WL 5366479
(ICSID 2007)
84. Id.
85. Parkerings-Compagneit v. Lithuania, 2007 WL 5366481 (ICSID 2007),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=casesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC682_En&caseld=C252.
86. Id. at 332
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a stabilization clause or some other provision protecting it against
unexpected.and unwelcome changes."87 It appears that the tribu-
nal recognized that because the parties had not included a stabili-
zation clause, the investor assumed the business risk that
Lithuania might modify its legislation or approve regulations that
would adversely affect the investment.88
Given these considerations, it would seem that the stabiliza-
tion clause and the state's bona fide right to regulate are not
mutually exclusive, "rather the stabilization clause puts a rider on
such exercise which is an assertion of good faith in a contractual
relationship."89 A stabilization clause may prove effective in
memorializing the expectations of the parties in more detail than
a treaty or a municipal law. Thus, stabilization clauses, especially
if thoughtfully negotiated and drafted, could allow tribunals to
avoid reliance on the gray-area standards of good faith, and fair
and equitable treatment, which are, in many instances, likely to
be excessively subjective standards. Furthermore, a stabilization
clause should allow a tribunal to recognize a contractual breach
with greater ease and precision, thus avoiding the sensitive issue
of having to decide when a regulation has exceeded the bounds of
fair and equitable treatment toward an investor and, thus,
becomes an instance of expropriation. Finally, when there is a
breach of an obligation involving an explicit state promise to
respect the agreement, the breach logically becomes a more seri-
ous act or omission, entailing a higher degree of responsibility
that may affect any award for damages.9 It is primarily for these
reasons that a number of commentators agree that the inclusion
of a stabilization clause is a useful tool for providing additional
protection against detrimental action by a host state. 1
V. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
International treaties can either be seen as complementing or
completely replacing the need to bargain for a stabilization clause
in an investor-state agreement. A BIT, for instance, may be impor-
tant in giving treaty status to a stabilization provision contained
87. Id. at $ 336.
88. Steven Smith et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT'L
LAW 363, 385 (2008).
89. Maniruzzaman, supra note 74, at 34.
90. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 5, at 49-50.
91. See, e.g., Matthew Wendlandt, SGS v. Philipines and the Role of ICSID
Tribunals in Investor-State Contract Disputes, 43 TEx. INT'L L.J. 523, 557 (2008);
Waelde & Ndi, supra note 4, at 243.
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in a host government's petroleum regime by way of the "fair and
equitable treatment" standard established in most BITs.92 In this
respect, BITs may be seen as partly replacing the need to incorpo-
rate into a contract with a host state an internationalization
regime of stabilization and arbitration as they may contain dupli-
cative provisions.93 This, however, does not obviate the benefits of
providing for stabilization clauses in the agreements themselves.
Well-negotiated "investment contracts are potentially the
most effective investment protection instruments available"94 as
they allow the investors to draft terms especially designed for
their investment needs. An investor who seeks to use a BIT to pro-
tect against regulatory change will typically have to argue its case
under the treaty's general expropriation provisions and will not be
able to avail itself of the more specific contract-based commit-
ments of legal stability provided to investors in a well-drafted
investment contract.95 Hence, an investor that is concerned about
significant political risk will wish to negotiate a specific agree-
ment rather than remain subject to the general rules applicable to
the rest of the investor community.96 Nevertheless, BITs will still
play an important role, especially for those investors unwilling or
unable to avail of their own negotiating strength.97
VI. CLASSIFICATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
Assuming the ability of the contracting parties to negotiate,
and their respective bargaining power and desire to tailor a par-
ticular international petroleum agreement, concession arrange-
ment or production sharing agreement, the drafters can choose to
use different types of stabilization clauses. The traditional
formula was to provide for a rigid structure that would effectively
"freeze" the laws and regulations applicable to the agreement. An
example of this classic approach can be found in the Libyan con-
cession agreements of the 1970s, discussed supra. It has been
92. See Peter Cameron, Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of
Rules in Host Countries: Tools for Oil & Gas Investors, 40, http://www.aipn.org/
members/modelagreements/research.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
93. Mathew Wendlandt, SGS v. Philippines and the Role of ICSID Tribunals in
Investor-State Contract Disputes, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 523, 525 (2008).
94. Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in
International Investment Law, 3 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 121, 133.
95. Id. at 134.
96. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 4, at 243.
97. Charles Brower & Stephan Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CI. J. INT'L L. 471, 481 (2009).
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reported that less extensive forms of "freezing" are still in use
today, including current agreements with Angola, Cambodia,
Guyana, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malta, Poland and Tunisia. 8
During the past two decades, parties have tended towards
employing one of several more modern formulas. The reasons for
this are threefold: 1) the classic approach may not be compatible
with the host country's constitutional framework; 2) the enhanced
capacity of the NOCs and the increase in petroleum prices have
tended to reduce the bargaining power of investors; and 3) the
increased awareness for host states to retain the right to regulate
particularly environmental matters.9 Given these considerations,
recent stabilization provisions have tended to adopt a middle
ground, allowing for unilateral action by states while at the same
time indicating a variety of ways to reestablish the economic equi-
librium of the contract.
The different types of stabilization provisions can be catego-
rized into the following four groups in order of their potential ben-
efit to the foreign investor:
Provides for the greatest investor
The Classic protection, stipulating that the laws
Freezing Clauses and regulations applicable to the
agreement are those in force at the
time of the execution of the agreement.
Implies that the contract terms are to
remain in effect but with a clear
stipulation that new laws will
nevertheless apply to the IOC; however,
Stipulated if the new laws affect the stabilization
Economic Balancing provision, the agreement is to be
automatically amended, in principle
without negotiation, so that the
economic balance between the parties
will be restored.
98. See Cameron, supra note 92, at 28.
99. Id. at 95-99.
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Provides that any new law will be
applicable to the IOC but that if a new
law affects the stabilization provision,
the agreement will be automatically
amended so that the economic balanceNon-spcecined between the parties will be restored;
Economic Bhowever, in this case the provision only
stipulates that the amendment is to
result from mutual agreement without
specifying the nature of the
amendment.
Provides for the weakest form of
stability for the IOC, indicating that
any new laws will apply to the IOC and
that the agreement will be
Negotiated automatically amended to reflect such
Economic Balancing new laws, but that such amendments
are to stem from new negotiations
between the parties with the goal, but
not the assurance, of restoring the
economic balance between the parties. °°
VII. THE VENEZUELAN CONTEXT
A. The Situation in Latin American
During the last decade, some Latin American countries
appear to have entered into yet another phase of the privatization-
nationalization cycle that has seemingly plagued the region ever
since their independence as Spanish and Portuguese colonies.10 '
This cyclical approach between left-leaning nationalistic govern-
ments and rightist, pro-private investment regimes has been well
documented in the contexts of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela.0 2
In 2006, for instance, President Evo Morales of Bolivia
announced the nationalization of the natural gas industry affect-
ing the interests of Spain and Brazil.10 3 Initially, Bolivia's position
100. The final three categories were coined by Frank C. Alexander, Jr. See Frank C.
Alexander, Jr., "The Three Pillars of Security of Investment Under PSCs and Other
Host Government Contracts," Chapter 7, of Institute for Energy Law of the Centre for
American and International Law's Fifty-Fourth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law
(Publication 640, Release 54), Lexis Nexis Mathew Bender (2003), Sec. 7.03[1].
101. See Chua, supra note 8.
102. Id.
103. Supreme Decree 28701 declared that the 180 day negotiation period had ended
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was that no compensation would be paid, but now apparently
some payment is to be made, although the terms of payment
remain unclear.' The government of Ecuador terminated Occi-
dental's contract while also deciding to impose an additional 50%
levy on oil revenues, justified by the high price of oil in the inter-
national market. 10 5 And finally, in Venezuela, President Hugo
Chdvez has both imposed a number of forced sales in some circum-
stances, as well as outright nationalizations. 18 In the case of Ven-
ezuela the nationalization-privatization cycle has been
exacerbated by the extreme dependency of the local economy on
the exportation of oil1"7 and its condition as a petro-state has led to
the increased role of the public sector, weakened public and pri-
vate institutions, centralized concentration of power, and
increased corruption.'
B. Venezuela's Petroleum Industry
In 2009, Venezuela's proven reserves were calculated at
approximately 99 billion barrels, the largest reserves in South
America;'0 9 additionally, Venezuela boasts that it could have the
and that all oil and gas resources in the country were nationalized. Decreto Supremo
28701 de Nacionalizaci6n de los Hidrocarburos, 1 de Mayo de 2006 (Bol.). Article 5 of
Law No. 3058 required that all foreign companies operating in Bolivia had to enter
into new contracts with the state oil company (YPFB) within 180 days. Ley de
Hidrocarburos, Ley No. 3058, 17 de Mayo de 2005 (Bol.).
104. Carter Dougherty, Bolivian Says He Won't Pay Energy Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/11/world/americas/11
cnd-bolivia.html?r=l&scp=l&sq=Bolivian%20Says%2He%2OWon%27t%2OPay%20
Energy%20Companies&st=cse.
105. Jane Monahan, Ecuador Oil Policy Upsets Private Firms, BBC NEWS, Oct. 3,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5359458.stm.
106. Among the affected foreign investments in Venezuela to date are the following:
the interests of Verizon in the largest telephone company (CANTV), the interests of
AES in the largest electric company (Electricidad de Caracas), the interests of CMS
Energy in Seneca, the interests of the Mexican Cemex, and the four heavy crude
investments in the Orinoco river basin. Brian Ellsworth, FactBox: Venezuela's
Nationalizations Under Hugo Chdvez, REUTERS, Apr. 4 2008, http://www.reuters.com/
article/worldNews/idUSN0438985820080404.
107. "Oil generates about 80 percent of the country's total export revenue,
contributes about half of the central government's income, and is responsible for
about one-third of the country's gross domestic product." Cesar J. Alvarez &
Stephanie Hanson, Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Feb. 9, 2009, httpJ/www.cfr.org/publication/12089.
108. See Ibsen Martinez, The Curse of the Petro-State: The Example of Venezuela,
LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.econlib.org/Library/Columns/y2005/
Martinezpetro.html.
109. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela, Jan.
2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Venezuela/Oil.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
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largest reserves in the world."' In 2007 Venezuela had net oil
exports of around 1.9 million barrels per day, which placed it as
the seventh largest exporter in the world and by far the largest in
the Western Hemisphere."' Venezuelan crude oil, however, is gen-
erally characterized as both "heavy," meaning less than 300 API
gravity, and sour, meaning greater than 0.7% sulfur content by
weight." 2 Hence, in order to convert Venezuela's crude into higher
value petroleum products, specialized refineries are needed, and
capacity is relatively limited.
Venezuela's oil industry dates back to 1913 when the first oil
well was drilled and when two foreign companies with long ties to
Venezuela, Royal Dutch Shell and Rockefeller's Standard Oil (now
ExxonMobil), became the first producers in the country."3 By 1929
Venezuela was the second largest oil producer in the world.' In
the 1950's world oil prices began to suffer due to an over-supply of
oil in the international market, given increased production from
the Middle East."' The following decade saw the birth of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), pro-
moted by Venezuela as a founding member (along with Saudi Ara-
bia), which has evolved into a powerful cartel. 116
C. Venezuela's First Nationalization
In 1973, a "young, energetic extrovert" from the Western
State of Tachira, Carlos Andr~s Prez, centered his campaign for
president on the notion that the Venezuelan state should control
the extraordinary riches that lay under Venezuelan soil. 1 7 His
110. As of the end of 2008 Venezuela boasts that it has some 236 billion barrels of
heavy and extra heavy crude reserves that are still in the process of being certified.
Petr6leos de Venezuela, S.A., ZCudl es la Reserva de Hidrocarburos de Venezuela?,
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/readmenu.tpl.html&newsid
_objlid=480&newsidtemas=8 (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). If these reserves were to
be certified, Venezuela would have the largest reserves in the world.
111. Energy Information Administration, supra note 109.
112. Purvin & Getz Inc., Venezuela Crude Oil and Refined Products, U.S. MARKET
ANALYSIS, May 2001, at 1.
113. See R6MULO BETANCOURT, VENEZUELA, POLTICA Y PETR6LEO 21-26 (2d ed.
Monte Avila Editores Latinoamericana 2001) (1956).
114. FRANKLIN TUGWELL, THE POLITICS OF OIL IN VENEZUELA 38 (1975).
115. Luis Pedro Espafia & Osmel Manzano, Venezuela y Su Petr6leo, El Origen de
la Renta, 10 TEMAS DE FORMACION SOCIOPOLTICA 3, 42 (2003).
116. See Luis E. Cuervo, OPEC From Myth to Reality, 30 Hous. J. INT'L L. 433, 524,
552 (2008).
117. See Centro de Investigaci6n de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo, Carlos
Andr6s P6rez Rodriguez (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/bio
grafias lideres-politicos/america del sur/venezuela/carlos-andres-perez-rodrigu
ez#2 [hereinafter Carlos Andrds Prez Rodriguez]. Although in this regard Pdrez was
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campaign slogan, "Democracy with Energy," was one of the keys
to his electoral victory."8 The day P6rez was sworn into office coin-
cided with the end of the OPEC oil embargo initiated by the Arab
OPEC members as a consequence of the Israeli victory in the
"Yom Kippur War," which had caused the "first oil shock" and
prices to soar from $3.50 to $10 per barrel from late 1973 to early
1974.1" The windfall in oil income motivated Perez to effect an
ambitious plan of nationalizing Venezuela's core hydrocarbon and
metallurgical industries.
By late 1974 Perez had nationalized the iron ore industry and
laid the basis for a major state steel industry. However, the key
objective was the nationalization of the petroleum industry,
effected through the enactment of the "Organic Law that Reserves
to the State the Industry and Trade of Hydrocarbons" of 1975
(hereinafter the "Nationalization Law"). 2 ° The Nationalization
Law provided that for reasons of "national convenience and inter-
est" all activities and pending projects related to the hydrocarbons
industry would now belong to the state and that the "concessions
granted to private companies are hereby extinguished." 2' At the
time Venezuela had fourteen concession agreements with foreign
oil companies.'22 In 1976 the government was flush with cash
given three years of high oil prices, and agreed to pay compensa-
tion to all of the oil companies. 2 '
P6rez was also responsible for the creation of Venezuela's
NOC, Petr6leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), which initially oper-
ated as a holding company and managed the fourteen private com-
both taking advantage of the situation that already existed from the increased oil
prices and leverage resulting from the OPEC from the oil embargo of 1973, as well as
giving voice to the long-standing policy enunciated by R6mulo Betancourt as early as
the 1930s to the effect that the natural resource countries should both control and
derive more benefit from their resources. See generally BETANCOURT, supra note 113.
118. Carlos Andrds Prez Rodriguez, supra note 117.
119. See generally Susan L. Sakmar, Bringing Energy Trade into the WTO: The
Historical Context, Current Status, and Potential Implications for the Middle East
Region, 18 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 92 (2008).
120. Ley Org6.nica que reserva al Estado la Industria y el Comercio de los
Hidrocarburos, 1.769 D.O., 29 de Agosto de 1975, p. 123 (Venez.), available at http://
www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/1/339/12.pdf.
121. Id. Legally, what occurred was the anticipated reconversion of the prior
concession agreements, although this was tantamount to nationalization.
122. Carlos Eduardo Padr6n, Proceso de Apertura Petrolera, in TEMAS DE DERECHO
PETROLERO 19, 25 (Juan Crist6bal Carmona Borjas coordinator, 1998) (Venez.).
123. Brandon Marsh, Preventing the Inevitable: The Benefits of Contractual Risk
Engineering in Light of Venezuela's Recent Oil Field Nationalization, 13 STAN. J.L.
Bus & FiN. 453, 459 (2008).
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panies that had in effect been nationalized.2 4 From 1976 through
1991 PDVSA was the sole operator of Venezuela's oil. 125 Although
the Venezuelan government was the sole shareholder, PDVSA
was for at least the first decade professionally managed and
enjoyed operational autonomy, including with respect to its earn-
ings. 126 As a consequence, in this period PDVSA gained a strong
reputation for competence and efficiency, while investing heavily
in refineries and distribution channels in the U.S. and Europe,
thereby creating a vertical integration that was key to Venezuela's
market penetration, given its particular mix of largely heavy
crude. 27
D. The "Apertura Petrolera," or the Oil Opening
During the mid and late 1980s Venezuela's economy had
begun to suffer dramatically. One principal factor was the
decrease in oil prices, which fell below $10 a barrel by mid-1986 as
a result of slowing global demand, but also due to OPEC's inabil-
ity to enforce production quotas on its members. 128 The high oil
prices of the 1970s had also led to increased exploration and pro-
duction efforts by non-OPEC actors. In this context, and based on
deficit spending in the late 1980s, by the time of the 1988 presi-
dential election, Venezuela was on the verge of a financial crisis,
in a period of inflation, and unable to make payments on its $33
billion foreign debt.'29 P6rez, who was again eligible to run for
president under the 1961 Constitution, having spent two five-year
presidential terms out of office, based his campaign on reminding
the electorate of the "economic miracle" of his earlier presidency. 3 0
The energy policy of Perez's second presidency, beginning in
early 1989, was, however, quite different. Seeking to increase pro-
duction, the government sought to find an escape hatch in the
Nationalization Law approved during Perez's first term and by
124. Alan Riding, International Report: Venezuela's Oil Dealings Abroad, N.Y.
TiMEs, Jan. 18, 1988, at D6, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=940DE3D7113DF93BA25752COA96E948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
[hereinafter Riding, International Report].
125. EDUARDO NOVOA MONREAL, LA NAcIONALIZACION DEL PETR6LEO EN VENEZUELA
(1979), available at http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/libro.htm?l=339.
126. See generally Riding, International Report, supra note 124.
127. Marsh, supra note 123, at 460.
128. Espafia & Manzano, supra note 115, at 57.
129. Alan Riding, Rumblings in Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1989, at Al,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE4DBlF3DF931A
35750COA96F948260&sec=&spon=$amp;pagewanted=all.
130. Carlos Andr~s P~rez Rodriguez, supra note 117.
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which it could once again invite foreign investors to assist in
exploration and extraction activities without relinquishing owner-
ship of Venezuela's natural resources, as this would have been
illegal under the law.' Article 5 of the Nationalization Law
allowed the executive to enter into service agreements with pri-
vate parties so long as 1) the state was "guaranteed control" of the
undertaking, 2) the agreement was for a limited time, and 3) the
two houses of Congress approved the agreements.132 With respect
to defining state control, the Supreme Court determined that con-
trol was essentially a legal rather than an economic concept, thus
allowing the executive branch to permit foreign investors to have
direct participation, as well as shareholder control, in the service
agreements to be executed later.3 3 This was the model that was
used for the next wave of large-scale foreign investment in Vene-
zuela's petroleum industry.
The following ten-year phase, known as the "Apertura
Petrolera" or Oil Opening, occurred in several stages.3 4 First,
smaller, less capital-intensive projects were put up for bid during
three rounds in 1991, 1992 and 1997. Initially designed to apply
new technologies for secondary recovery of older oil deposits, these
later became the Operational Service Agreements, with an
increasingly expanded scope. Simultaneously, plans were also laid
for more complex projects intended to exploit and upgrade Vene-
zuela's extremely heavy crude in the Orinoco "tar" belt.' 3' Requir-
ing large amounts of capital and sophisticated technology, two
bidding rounds were held in 1993 and 1997 resulting in the sign-
ing of four Strategic Association Agreements ("SAA"). 36 Of these,
two were entered into in 1993 (Sincor and Petrozuata) and the
131. Padr6n, supra note 122, at 33.
132. Ley Org.nica que reserva al Estado la Industria y el Comercio de los
Hidrocarburos, 1.769 D.O., 29 de Agosto de 1975, p. 123, art. 5 (Venez.), available at
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/1/339/12.pdf.
133. Lagoven, S.A. (Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court] Apr. 23, 1991)
(Venez.), reprinted in Oscar R. Pierre Tapia, 4 JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA
DE JUSTICIA 113 (1991).
134. See Miranda Wainberg, From "Apertura Petrolera" to "Apertura Gas Natural"?
The Case of Venezuela, CENTER FOR ENERGY ECON., http://www.beg.utexas.edu/
energyecon/new-era/case studies/Apertura inVenezuela.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2009).
135. See Elisabeth Eljuri & Jos6 Ignacio Moreno, Los Convenios de Asociaci6n para
la Exploraci6n a Riesgo y Produccidn de Hidrocarburos Bajo el Esquema de
Ganancias Compartidas, in TEMAS DE DERECHO PETROLERO 67, 69 (Juan Crist6bal
Carmona Borjas coordinator, 1998) (Venez.).
136. Padr6n, supra note 122, at 33.
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other two in 1997 (Hamaca and Cerro Negro). The SAAs are the
principal focus of the remainder of this analysis.
The four SAAs were highly capital intensive, requiring invest-
ments well over $2 billion each 137 for a total investment of approxi-
mately $17 billion. All of these projects involved the extraction of
extra-heavy crude oil from the Orinoco belt, a 21,000 square mile
area in the south of the country, and its transportation, once par-
tially upgraded, through pipelines to specialized refineries located
at Jose on the Caribbean coast in the north, which were also inte-
gral parts of the SAAs.13 These four projects have been described
as being among the most complex in the world.139
In this context, it is important to note that the four SAAs
were the result of transparent public bidding procedures televised
on national television. 140 Moreover, they were the object of intense
national debate and obtained the required approvals from both
the executive and legislative branches, as well as the office of the
comptroller general. At the time these agreements were entered
into, this procedure was hailed as an exemplary process conducted
by a state oil company and with proper political approval.'
By virtue of the sizeable investments required of the foreign
investors, all four agreements included significant incentives for
the investors. With respect to taxation, the foreign investors
were taxed at the non-oil income tax rate of 34% rather than the
oil tax rate of 67%. 43 This was justified on the basis that the inves-
tors were merely service providers, as they could not count their
allotted fields as part of their reserves and all marketing of the
output was reserved to PDVSA.'" Regarding royalties, the two
137. Marsh, supra note 123, at 463.
138. See Juan Forero, For Venezuela, a Treasure in Oil Sludge, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2006, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/01/business/worldbusiness/
01oil.html.
139. Id.
140. Luis E. Giusti, Opinion, Los Convenios Operativos, EL NACIONAL, Feb. 5, 2006,
at A8.
141. Id.
142. It has been noted that the incentives were highly beneficial to the foreign
investors. This may have been required to entice the same oil companies whose
operations had been nationalized during the 1970s to return to Venezuela. See Tim
Padgett, Chdvez's Not-So-Radical Oil Move, TIME, May 1, 2007, http://www.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599,1616644,00.html.
143. Carlos Jim~nez, El Programa de Reactivaci6n de Campos Petroleros y los
Convenios de Servicios de Operaci6n en Venezuela, in TEMAS DE DERECHO PETROLERO,
54, 66 (Juan Crist6bal Carmona Borjas coordinator, 1998) (Venez.).
144. See generally Marsh, supra note 123, at 462-66. Article 54 of the 1995
Venezuelan Income Tax Law allowed for a special rate for service providers.
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SAAs negotiated in 1993 (Sincor and Petrozuata) had guaranteed
royalty rates of 1% for the first ten years and a royalty of 16.66%
thereafter. The two other SAAs negotiated in 1997 (Hamaca and
Cerro Negro) were free from all royalties.'45 Also, it was provided
that Venezuela's NOC, PDVSA, would serve as the guarantor
against state intervention. PDVSA was to compensate the foreign
investors for any "adverse economic situation resulting from adop-
tion of governmental decisions or changes in the legislation which
causes a discriminatory treatment."'46 However, this compensa-
tory mechanism would only be applicable as long as the price of oil
and the foreign investors' profits remained below a certain eco-
nomic baseline. 147
E. The Cerro Negro Project
Before describing the situation of the Cerro Negro project it is
necessary to point out that in doing the research for the present
analysis two general difficulties were encountered. First, the
agreements reviewed are relatively vague with respect to the
respective rights and obligations of the IOC and the host govern-
ment. It has been reported that given the nature of the bargaining
process and the often piecemeal production of the documentation,
it is a common experience that upstream petroleum regimes tend
to result in poorly drafted agreements.' Second, full and com-
plete access to the four agreements was difficult to achieve. 9
However, it has been reported that the texts of the four agree-
ments were generally similar, particularly with respect to the
rights and duties of the parties in case of disputes." ° In any case,
145. Marsh, supra note 123, at 464.
146. Id. at 465.
147. It is reported that in the case of Petrozuata, for instance, for governmental
actions affecting profits generated above a price of $25 per barrel PDVSA would not
need to pay compensation. See Marsh, supra note 123, at 465.
148. Alexander, Jr., supra note 100.
149. In part this may be due to the tensions created by the two pending arbitration
proceedings before ICSID. Visits to the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum in
Venezuela proved largely unsuccessful, perhaps for precisely these reasons. Also,
during confidential conversations with local and international outside counsel, as well
as in-house counsel, located both in and outside of Venezuela, it was suggested that
the companies that have now renegotiated new terms with the Venezuelan
government are cautious of their respective bargains and have kept all related
information and documentation confidential.
150. Report of the Special Commission to Investigate the Irregularities Detected by
the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum Committed in the Formulation, Celebration
and Execution of the Operating Agreements, Strategic Association Agreements and
the International Negotiations, Special Report given before the National Assembly,
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for the purposes of the present study the agreement known as the
Cerro Negro SAA is perhaps the most illustrative."'
The Cerro Negro SAA, entered into in 1997, was an agree-
ment between what was then Mobil Oil Corp., Mobil Producci6n e
Industrializaci6n de Venezuela Inc., and Lagoven, a subsidiary of
PDVSA that at the time was one of the four principal operating
subsidiaries.152 The agreement covered a series of activities,
including exploration, production, transportation and partial
upgrading of 100,000 barrels per day of crude from the Orinoco
belt.5 ' The term of the contract was for thirty-five years. It also
provided for the construction of upgrading facilities in the Cerro
Negro area, the construction a further refining facility at the Jose
Industrial Complex on the Caribbean coast, and a transportation
infrastructure of pipelines and tanks.' Because of the extensive
infrastructure construction required, the Cerro Negro project did
not come on stream until June 2001.
The Cerro Negro SAA contained a relatively weak and convo-
luted stabilization clause with an emphasis on maintaining the
applicable tax structure. The stabilization clause itself provided
that in the event that the "Foreign Party" deemed that an event
that would cause a material adverse impact had occurred, it would
notify PDVSA. Then, but only if PDVSA concurred that a unilat-
eral adverse event had occurred, PDVSA would cooperate with the
Foreign Party to pursue legal action and "negotiate in good faith
compensatory damages and/or possible modifications to the Agree-
ment designed to restore the economic benefit that the Foreign
Party would have received had the [event] not occurred." 55
Significantly, though, a unilateral adverse event constituting
a breach of the agreement was defined as a change in applicable
May 2006, http://www.petroleumworld.com/graficos-alianzas/nforme-pdvsa-mayo
2006.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
151. Strategic Association Agreement between Mobil Oil Corp., Mobil Producci6n e
Industrializaci6n de Venezuela Inc., and Lagoven, S.A. of 1997 ("Cerro Negro SAA")
(on file with the Ministry of Energy and Mines, Caracas, Venezuela) [hereinafter
Cerro Negro SAAI.
152. In November of 1999, Exxon and Mobil merged and formed ExxonMobil
Corporation. See Exxon, Mobil in $80B Deal, CNN MoNEY, Dec. 1, 1998, http:/!
money.cnn.com/1998/12/01/deals/exxon/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
153. Jos6 Urdaneta Pdrez, Marco Jur(dico de la Inversi6n Privada en la Industria
Petrolera, Convenios de Asociaci6n, in TEMAS DE DERECHO PETROLERO 45, 49 (Juan
Crist6bal Carmona Borjas ed., 1998).
154. Mobil and Lagoven Announce Joint Venture Activities in U.S. and Venezuela,
BusiNEss WIRE, Sept. 17, 1996, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOEIN/is_1996_
Sept_17/ai_18681235/pg l?tag=artBody;coll (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
155. Cerro Negro SAA, supra note 151, at cl. 15.1(a).
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laws or regulations that would be discriminatory or "unjust and is
applicable to the Project or any Foreign Party... and is generally
not applicable to entities, both public and private, engaged in
extra heavy crude oil upgrading in the Republic of Venezuela; or,
with respect to tax rates, foreign exchange controls or condemna-
tion of assets of... a Foreign Party."156 However, the agreement
seemed to at least provide for greater stability with respect to tax
treatment by specifically indicating that the income tax imposed
on the project could not result in a material adverse impact, which
was defined as a variation of at least 4% in the disputed amount.
Furthermore, with respect to municipal taxes, the agreement
made PDVSA responsible for any burden affecting the Foreign
Party's gross revenue in the event that the aggregate municipal
tax exceeded 4%."'
The stabilization clause in the Cerro Negro agreement may be
classified as falling under the Negotiated Economic Balancing cat-
egory. Similar clauses are contained in concession agreements
awarded by Egypt in 2002, production sharing agreements
entered into by Vietnam in 1996, operating agreements signed by
Mozambique in 1998 and exploration agreements entered into by
Kazakhstan in 1997.158 However, by requiring that the Foreign
Party first notify PDVSA, and then only if the latter concurred
with the Foreign Party as to the occurrence and nature of the uni-
lateral event would PDVSA be required to undertake good faith
negotiations, made the Cerro Negro stabilization clause a weaker
provision than others in this category." 9
Some degree of comfort was provided by the arbitration
clause, however. 6 ° The relevant clause stated that if PDVSA did
not agree with the investor as to the unilateral treatment or if
there was deemed to be a breach of the minimum required thresh-
156. Cerro Negro SAA, supra note 151, at "Definitions," "Discriminatory Action."
157. P~rez, supra note 153, at 49.
158. See Cameron, supra note 92, at 32-35.
159. Nevertheless, it is reported to be among the most typical kind of commitment.
See id. at 32.
160. It should be noted that Exxon Mobil brought the case against Venezuela before
ICSID under the Netherlands - Venezuela Investment Promotion and Protection
Convention ("Netherlands - Venezuela BIT"). In fact, this event triggered Venezuela's
desire to renegotiate the Netherlands - Venezuela BIT to avoid future invocation of
its terms and future disputes to be taken before ICSID. See Brian Ellsworth &
Marguerita Choy, Venezuela to Renegotiate Dutch Investment Treaty, REUTERS, Apr.
30, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN30537960
20080430?sp=true. On November 1, 2008 Venezuela terminated the Netherlands-
Venezuela BIT.
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old, either party could commence arbitration proceedings within
90 days."' The arbitration clause, though, did not give the arbitra-
tors the ability to rewrite the agreement but rather only to award
damages and to make "recommendations on amendments to the
Agreement that would restore the economic benefit that the For-
eign Party would have received." 62
F. The Plan for "Full Oil Sovereignty' 6 3 Over
Petroleum Resources
Since 1999 Venezuela's oil policy has been oriented toward
recovering the state's control over its natural resources and "ulti-
mately, this is where the power of oil-exporting countries [contin-
ues] to comes from."'" Pursuant to this, in 2001 a new Organic
Law of Hydrocarbons (the "Hydrocarbons Law") was enacted by
President ChAvez under the extraordinary decree-law powers he
had at the time largely without consultation outside of the govern-
ment and reportedly only with the presence of one representative
from the private sector. 6 5 The new law established higher royalty
and tax rates for all hydrocarbons activities, but at the time of its
entry into force it only applied to future agreements. 6  The Hydro-
carbons Law established that all activities related to the explora-
tion, extraction, collection, transportation and initial storage of
hydrocarbons (collectively defined as the "Primary Activities") can
only be carried out by the state, directly or indirectly, through
161. Cerro Negro SAA, supra note 151, at cl. 15.1(b).
162. Id.
163. The policy of Full Oil Sovereignty has been summarized as follows: "The policy
of Full Oil Sovereignty [is] a fundamental strategy of the Bolivarian Government of
Venezuela. [It] shall propel the domestic social development because the State will
receive additional revenues that will be invested in programs with national, popular
and revolutionary foresight. The defense of our national sovereignty starts with the
reaffirmation of our ownership of our hydrocarbon resources and with the rescue of
the control of the oil activity, from the point of view of the tax and legal systems, along
with the effective participation of Petr6leos de Venezuela (PDVSA) in the business."
See 141st Extraordinary Meeting in Caracas OPEC: Bastion of Oil Sovereignty, THE
NEw PDVSA CONTACT NEWSLETTER, June 2006, available at http://www.pdvsa.com/
interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/138153.PDF.
164. Bernard Mommer, Venezuelan Oil Politics at the Crossroads, March 2001,
httpJ/www.oxfordenergy.orgcomment.php?0103 (last visited Oct. 14, 2008).
165. La Ley de Hidrocarburos: A Contracorriente con la Modernidad, Interview of
Carlos Granier, ANALfTICA, Dec. 19, 2001, http://www.analitica.com/va/economia/
opinion/5040738.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
166. Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Org~nica de Hidrocarburos (Decree with Force of
Organic Law of Hydrocarbons), Decree No. 1.510, (2001), Official Gazette No. 37.323.
(Venez.). Under Article 3 of Venezuela's Civil Code, laws cannot have a retroactive
effect.
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wholly-owned state companies or through mixed companies, but
which are controlled and more than 50% owned by the state.
By 2004 President Chdvez was in his sixth year in office and
oil prices had risen from around $18 per barrel in 1999 to close to
$50 in mid-2004.1" In September 2004, Chdvez announced that
applicable royalties would be increased to 16.66%. Then in May
2006, despite assurances in 2002 that the Hydrocarbons Law
would only apply to new projects,169 Chdtvez announced that the
tax rates stipulated in the Hydrocarbons Law would apply retro-
actively to the four SAAs, thus raising the applicable income tax
rate from 34% to 50%."' ° It was estimated that these combined pol-
icies would reduce net revenues for the foreign investors operating
in the Orinoco belt by up to 60%."l
On April 12, 2005, the Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and
Petroleum (MEP) declared that the SAAs were illegal and notified
the foreign investors that they would have to "migrate" their
projects into mixed companies in which the state would have at
least a 51% interest.172 The government's position was that a uni-
lateral modification of the SAAs was legally permitted because
these were null and void ab initio, and contrary to the require-
ments of Article 5 of the 1976 Nationalization Law. 173 Importantly,
the government considered that the SAAs granted the foreign
167. Id. at art. 9, 22.
168. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela,
supra note 109.
169. Bernard Mommer, Venezuela: Un Nuevo Marco Legal E Institucional
Petrolero, REVISTA VENEZOLANA DE ECONOMIA Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES, MAYo-AGoSTo, at
201-207, available at http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/177/17780209.pdf.
170. Asociaciones de la Faja cancelardn 33,3% de regalia y 50% en ISLR,
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., available at http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=
interface.sp/design/readmenu.tpl.html&newsid-objid=3823&newsidtemas=130.
171. Fitch Ratings, Fitch Downgrades, Cerro Negro, Sincor & Hamaca; Placed on
Watch Negative, May 11, 2006, http://www.fitchvenezuela.comInoticias/pcsh0506.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
172. The forced migration of the SAAs had been preceded a year earlier by the same
forced migration of the Operating Service Agreements resulting in the formation of
seventeen new joint ventures all dominated by PDVSA, with at least a 60%
controlling participation. Later the government changed its position to insist on a
minimum participation of 60% on the part of PDVSA for the SAAs, as well. See
MINISTRO RAFAEL RAMIREZ DISCUTIO EL MODELO DE EMPRESA MIXTA EN LA COMISI6N
PERMANENTE DE ENERGIA Y MINAS DE LA AN, PETR6LEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., Mar. 22,
2006, available at http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/sala
prensareadnew.tpl.html&newsid-obj_id=2380&newsid_temas=l.
173. Report of the Special Commission to Investigate the Irregularities Detected by
the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum Committed in the Formulation, Celebration
and Execution of the Operating Agreements, Strategic Association Agreements and
the International Negotiations, supra note 150.
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investors activities that were "reserved to the state" and that
given the high production volumes and profits accorded to the for-
eign investors under the SAAs, for these reasons the SAAs were
more than "simple service or operating agreements permitted
under the law." 74
Negotiations regarding the terms and conditions for the so-
called "migration" into mixed companies were complex, involving
political tensions, a number of rival parties, and requiring the for-
eign investors to take considerable losses, or at least forego signifi-
cant future profits. 75  There were also considerable time
constraints as the parties worked under a March 31, 2006 dead-
line set by the MEP. The documentation being negotiated included
the contract for conversion into mixed companies, the bylaws of
the mixed companies, future business plans, operating policies
and procedures, and a contract for the sale of hydrocarbons by the
mixed companies to PDVSA, which alone was permitted to market
petroleum products. 76 On March 18, 2006, the four SAAs were ter-
minated by law. 77 Then on March 31 the decisions creating the
mixed companies and approving their bylaws by the congress were
published in the Official Gazette, thus formally completing the
"migration" process. 17
Only ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused to reach agree-
ments with PDVSA, the MEP and the Venezuelan government. In
contrast, ChevronTexaco, Statoil, Total, ENI, BP and Sinopec all
agreed to new terms and currently hold stakes in their respective
mixed companies. 179 It has been estimated that if the contracts
had remained in force, the companies stood to make an additional
$7.7 billion, while the total losses to all foreign investors are in the
174. Id.
175. Stanley Reed, You're Working for Chdvez Now, BusIEss WEEK, May 15, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_20/b3984012.htm (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008).
176. J.L Keffer & M.V. Vargas, Venezuela: Migrating Away from the Apertura
Petrolera, http://apps.kslaw.com/Library/publication/OGELKefferVargas.Apertura
Petrolera.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
177. Ley de Regularizaci6n de la Participaci6n Privada en las Actividades
Primarias Previstas en el Decreto No. 1.510 con Fuerza de Ley Orgdnica de
Hidrocarburos, Official Gazette No. 38.419, (2006). Article 1 of this law established
that the law would regulate all contracts entered into during the so-called "apertura
petrolera." Article 4 established that the agreements subject to the framework of the
law would be terminated.
178. See Official Gazette of Venezuela No. 38.410, March 31, 2006.
179. Ficha Tgcnica: Arbitraje ExxonMobil contra la Repdblica Bolivariana de
Venezuela, Embassy of Venezuela in France, http://www.embavenez-paris.com/
embavenez.php?cat=pei&inc=exxon (last visited Dec. 15, 2008).
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neighborhood of $3.7 billion.18 ° On October 10, 2007, ExxonMobil
filed a demand for arbitration before ICSID, and although it had
been reported that ConocoPhillips continued to attempt a negoti-
ated settlement, on December 13, 2007, it also filed for arbitration
before ICSID. 18'
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Reducing the uncertainty of extractive sector investment con-
tracts also tends to reduce the cost of such investments for the
investors and host states, because investors often take political
and economic risks into account in the pricing of their invest-
ments. 182 Moreover, such investments generally require considera-
ble external financing from lending institutions and capital
markets, which are sensitive to investment security. 8 3 Naturally,
given the opposing interests of the parties involved in a cross bor-
der energy sector investment, the IOCs will try to negotiate the
most protective form of stabilization clause, while the host states
and their NOCs will bargain to the contrary. Ideally, however, the
parties will seek to work together to reduce risks and, hence,
lower the costs of financing large infrastructure projects entailing
the high sunk costs normally associated with petroleum projects.
In this respect, stabilization clauses continue to play a relevant
and useful role as a form of contractual risk reduction.
Resource industries-and oil in particular-move in cycles." 4
When oil prices are high it has been more feasible for governments
to embark on a nationalization cycle by expropriating, renegoti-
ating contracts, and raising taxes,' 5 as Venezuela has done in
recent years. Also, when prices are high enough most of the oil
companies have still preferred to continue with even a reduced
participation rather than to exit, as has been the case for a major-
ity of the major oil companies operating in Venezuela.
180. Reed, supra note 175.
181. See Mobil Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
27 and ConocoPhillips Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/30. It should be noted that the SAAs did not provide for ICSID arbitration, but
rather for arbitration in New York under the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce. However, the ICSID claims have been brought under applicable BITs. See
Eljuri & Moreno, supra note 135, at 77.
182. Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority, and International Investment Law, 20 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 465, 501 (2005).
183. See generally SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, Tim LAw AND BusmIEss OF INTERNATIONAL
PROJECT FINANCE (3d ed. 2008).
184. Walde, supra note 7, at 65.
185. Id.
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Intriguingly, however, during the preparation of the present
study, oil prices have fallen from an all time high of $147 per bar-
rel in July of 2008 down to around $32 per barrel as of December
2008 and with the prospect of a worldwide recession, it is antici-
pated that oil prices may trend even lower.'86 Hence, with oil
prices close to a fifth of what they were at their peak, and with the
trend in world demand toward further decline,'87 the leverage of
host states will most likely diminish.'88 IOCs will continue to
invest as they compete for available resources, but during the next
foreign investment cycle in countries like Venezuela, it would
seem reasonable to assume that IOCs should be able to negotiate
enhanced legal and, perhaps, financial assurance, as well as pre-
dictability, from host states.'89 Indeed as oil prices drop, Venezuela
has been faced with embracing Western oil companies once again
as it encourages companies such as ChevronTexaco, Royal Dutch/
Shell and Total to bid on a series of new projects. 90
In this context, stabilization clauses are a significant tool
with which IOCs can hope to achieve this objective by reducing
uncertainty. For the host state, stabilization clauses represent a
contractual alternative that permit varying degrees of flexibility
with respect to restricting their ability to make legislative and
regulatory changes without giving away too much of their sover-
eignty. In the future both parties should be able to benefit from
the advantages offered by this contractual risk reduction mecha-
nism, particularly with respect to capital intensive projects in
countries with elevated degrees of political risk.
Based on the considerable evidence of the potential benefit to
both IOCs and host governments of employing well-conceived sta-
bilization clauses in, especially, basic resource-related contracts
as a means of optimizing the productive relationship to the long-
term advantage of both parties, the question remains as to types
186. Mark Shenk, Oil Falls to 19-Month Low, Gasoline Tumbles, on Demand
Outlook, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=AJDSTCla5WB8&refer=worldwide.
187. See Grant Smith & Margot Habiby, OPEC Plans to Cut Supply as Oil Prices
Head Toward $50 a Barrel, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 18, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.comI
apps/news?pid=20601207&sid=afpqwTLNdO k&refer=energy.
188. See, e.g., Walde, supra note 7.
189. During the bottom of the so called "resource cycle," when commodity prices are
low, the host state will have less bargaining power and will adopt promotional and
concessionary measures by granting tax incentives and investment guarantees. Id.
190. See Simon Romero, Chdvez Let West Make Oil Bids as Price Plunge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/world/
americas/15venez.html?pagewanted=l&_r=2&sq=simon%20romero&st=cse&scp=2.
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of provisions, and the specific terms and conditions of the stabili-
zation clauses, that could offer the optimum outcome. While evi-
dently these factors have to be geared to the specific elements and
circumstances of each project, nevertheless it would beneficial to
both IOCs and host governments to attempt to conceive the kinds
of situations that could arise, as well as the conditions that would
be minimally acceptable, in any particular context. This type of
analysis would generally be on several planes, taking into account
the economic context and prospects, the financial expectations of
the project, legal conditions and safeguards, operational and man-
agerial aspects, and possibly others. Thus, it is to be presumed
that if the potential parties to such contracts develop their own
rational guidelines to these factors, they would be in a position to
make more efficacious investment decisions, as well as to negoti-
ate more successful investment agreements.
